In England 'multi-party' litigation can take various forms, of which the most important are (a) the opt-in system of Group Litigation Orders and (b) the opt-out system of Representative Proceedings. Category (b)n can yield damages to be distributed amongst the represented class, as recent case law shows. However, Group Litigation Order litigation is currently the main means of handling claims for compensation involving large groups of similarly affected `victims'. Group Litigation Orders involve high levels of case management.
INTRODUCTION
English 'multi-party' litigation can take one of four forms: 1 (I) test case litigation, supported by the staying of related individual actions; (II) consolidated litigation or joinder, so that claims are coupled together into a single but long snake of a case; 
I TEST CASES
Large numbers of related claims might be stayed (placed in suspense, but not dismissed) pending the outcome of a test case to be decided by the High Court.
For example, in the bank charges litigation the English courts were asked to pronounce on a point of law. The huge financial importance of the issue, and the banks' determination to defeat the challenge to their charges, led to successive appeals from the High Court to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. 6 In this test case a governmental agency, which is responsible for consumer protection and regulation of trading practices, invoked its statutory powers to seek a judicial declaration. It was hoped (although this hope proved to be misplaced) that this declaration would provide the legal basis for a vast number of bank customers to obtain relief in respect of alleged over-charging on their bank accounts. These charges, onerous and harsh, are imposed under contract when the customer exceeds a specified credit limit on her current banking account. But the test case failed when the Supreme Court held that the alleged over-charging could not be struck down under the relevant contractual regulations. This was because the contractual conditions fell within the prohibited zone of contractual freedom, as defined by the relevant legislation. 5 Procesos Collectivos: Class Actions (Buenos Aires, 2012) (reports submitted to the International Congress, 6-9 June, 2012, Argentina). the 'Railtrack' case, a group of claimants, formed an 'action committee'. This committee brought a single action in which a very large group of co-claimants (nearly 50,000 shareholders in that case) were full parties to the proceedings. These claimants sought monetary redress against a defendant company. Consolidated procedure is an opt-in system of multi-party litigation.
III REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS ('OPT OUT')
In these proceedings, the representative claimant brings an action on behalf of himself and others (the represented class). He is the only claimant. Members of that represented class are not parties to the action. Nevertheless, those class members will receive the benefits of a res judicata decision (or be subject to that decision), for example the benefit of a favourable declaration of legal entitlement. This form of proceeding is, therefore, an opt-out system. Representative proceedings are relatively uncommon in England. Representative proceedings can be commenced without the court's permission (conversely, however, the court can order that pending proceedings should be continued in representative form). Ultimately, the House of Lords issued a declaration in this action.
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That declaration established the true interpretation of a clause in the defendant company's life assurance policy. Ninety thousand policy-holders were bound by this decision.
The representative mechanism has been used to try to obtain effective injunctive relief against a disruptive unincorporated association (a 'protest group'), but the (2011) held that the lower court had over-stretched itself by attempting to render unidentified persons subject to immediate enforcement of the injunction. In that case numerous purchasers of flats, and sub-purchasers of flats, each of whom had bought leasehold interests in these dwellings, complained that the defendant builder had failed to construct satisfactory accommodation. Because of these defects, expensive repair work would be required. At first the cost of this work would be incurred by the management company responsible for maintaining the accommodation on behalf of leaseholders. That cost would then be passed on to individual tenants as increased 'service charges' in accordance with the contracts between the management company and the leaseholders. The present representative action would operate to enable the representatives of these different cohorts of leaseholders to obtain compensation. That compensation would be the amount of the extra service charges payable by the leaseholders to the management company as a result of the repair costs.
Court of Appeal in Astellas Pharma Ltd v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty
According to this decision, therefore, a representative claim for damages is available if (i) the court at the time of judgment will be able to determine the total amount of damages to be awarded in favour of the represented class and (ii) the court will also be able at judgment to determine the value of an individual represented person's entitlement to damages. The same judgment emphasises the procedural efficiency which can be derived from pursuing representative proceedings. Such a claim avoids the procedural cost of each alleged victim being joined in name as a full party to the relevant proceedings. The court acknowledged in this case that procedural economies can be achieved by a representative claim.
The court was keen in this litigation to facilitate such economies by rejecting the defendant's challenge to the representative proceedings.
IV GROUP LITIGATION ORDERS ('OPT IN')
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Such orders ('GLOs') were intended to become the mainstay of the English system's treatment of multi-party litigation (an 'opt-in' system). But it is possible that relaxation of representative proceedings, to accommodate some pecuniary In fact public funding for group litigation is seldom granted. 32 There are six main components of the GLO system. Thirdly, a group member enjoys both membership of the group and the general status of a fully-fledged 'party to civil proceedings'. Fourthly, during the progress of the GLO, the court will exercise extensive case management and issue directions. Fifthly, if the group loses the case, each group member is liable to the victorious party both for that member's share of the common costs of the proceedings and for any individual costs specifically incurred with respect to his claim; but if the group is victorious, the defeated party is liable to pay costs attributable both to the 'common costs' and the 'individual costs'. Finally, decisions on 'common' issues are binding on, and in favour of, the group.
A party who is adversely affected by a judgment or order can seek permission to appeal. 41 Such a 'common' issue will normally concern questions of liability or the availability of a particular head of loss. will not be brought unless there is substantial private funding or public support. As for the private source, it would appear that the conditional fee system has not worked in this context. This seems to be attributable to the absence (in this especially risky context) of ATE legal expenses insurance to cover the claimants' risk of liability for the defendant's costs. As for the public source, Mulheron notes the sharp decline in public funding of such litigation since the pre-2000 peak. 62 Mulheron noted four main reasons why potential group litigation litigants are reluctant to join such collective litigation, that is, to 'opt in': 63 (i) economic anxiety that they will become liable for substantial costs; (ii) psychological considerations, that they will be exposed to a rough-and-tumble experience; (iii) fear of reprisals, notably by employers; and (iv) basic misunderstanding of the system of civil compensation.
As a result of Mulheron's suggestion that the English system of civil procedure had scored low in its delivery of effective access to justice in this context, 66 
VI CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are dangers in adopting an 'opt out' system: potentially aggressive attempts to bring collective litigation; the prospect of very large gains being made by law firms; the fear of commercial and public entities being exposed to expensive and protracted litigation; inevitable increases in the cost of potential defendants' defensive measures; in particular, consumers and businesses paying more for insurance cover.
A generic opt-out class action for damages would have involved claimants' rights being championed by the joint enterprise of law firms (including foreign firms fishing in England for work) and commercial funders (or syndicates of funders) interested in profiting from others' litigation.
